This paper focuses on U.S. senators and their home-state approval ratings from 1981 to 1997. We examine these ratings to assess the relative impacts of tactical factors, such as the senators' bill sponsorship and media activity, and contextual influences, such as economic performance, state population size, and the evaluations and behavior of other elected officials. We find that the senators' own tactical behavior affects the approval ratings, but a stronger influence is the context in which the senators operate.
Approval ratings provide voters with a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of elected officials. Motivated by reelection, the politicians may act in many ways to represent the voters' interests. In turn, the voters register their approval or disapproval in the survey ratings, which signal to politicians the success of their efforts. Central components of this mechanism, however, remain open to question. Do the actions and tactics of elected officials actually influence constituent approval? Can the politicians overcome broader contextual influences beyond their control, such as national political and economic trends?
These questions are central to our understanding of public opinion and legislative behavior. We address them by focusing on U.S. senators and their home-state approval ratings from 1981 to 1997. These approval ratings are more widely available for senators than for representatives. In addition, members of the Senate provide more analytical leverage for examining tactical and contextual influences on the ratings. Each member shares an electorate with another senator. For each set of state-level contextual factors, we therefore have two different politicians working to win the electorate's support.
We use the senators' approval ratings to assess the relative impacts of tactical and contextual factors. Previous examinations of senators and their approval ratings typically focused on a small number of these factors, and the conclusions were often based on a cross section of senators at a single point in time (Binder, Maltzman, and Sigelman 1998; Hibbing and Alford 1990; Hibbing and Brandes 1983; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Sinclair 1990; Wright and Berkman 1986) . Our work incorporates a more comprehensive set of tactical and structural influences, using 17 years of senators' activities and approval ratings. We find that legislators' tactics affect voters' approval, but contextual factors can overwhelm the tactics' influence.
Determinants of Constituent Support
Reelection is a central goal of most elected officials (Mayhew 1974) . All members of Congress may use similar tactics for building and maintaining support among constituents (Jacobson 2001) . We focus on three such tactics.
The first tactic is introducing legislation. Senators may sponsor bills that assist constituents or affect national policies. Even if the bills fail to become law (which is the most likely outcome), the act of introducing them may produce political benefits for a senator. Bill sponsorship allows the senator to construct a legislative portfolio and reputation, which can enhance the legislator's standing on Capitol Hill as well as provide content for campaign messages (Sellers 1998; Schiller 1995) . If constituents reward senators for actively engaging in the legislative process, then introducing more bills boosts home-state support.
A second tactic for building home-state support involves a senator's position taking. Constituents are likely to react favorably to an elected official who supports issue positions close to their own. Roll-call voting offers the most prominent type of position taking for legislators, but the alternatives in an individual yea/nay vote may not include the position that a senator wishes to claim on an issue. This limited control over the voting alternatives (for most legislators) makes roll-call voting a less flexible tactic for building constituent support. Nevertheless, over the hundreds of individual votes in a single congressional session, a legislator may stake out a set of positions suggesting a general ideological orientation. The senator can expect greater home-state support if this ideology is close to that of the state electorate (Uslaner 1999; Wright and Berkman 1986) .
Senators can turn to a third tool for generating higher approval ratings: news coverage, which is an efficient way to reach large numbers of constituents. Free media coverage in national and local outlets can distribute information to more constituents than can be reached by sending newsletters or meeting voters individually.
The effectiveness of this tactic for boosting home-state support may depend upon the outlet in which a senator receives coverage. Senators' mentions in the New York Times appear positively related to constituent evaluations (Sinclair 1990 ), but their appearances on national network news programs do not (Binder, Maltzman, and Sigelman 1998) . The news programs run fewer and shorter stories, making it harder for an individual senator to win this type of coverage. A politician's efforts to win news coverage may reap more attention in national print outlets such as the New York Times. These outlets may therefore provide more information about the politician to constituents. Those same efforts to win coverage might prove even more successful in local news outlets, producing another positive correlation between senators' stories in these outlets and constituent evaluations (Arnold 2002; Schaffner 2001) . Thus, the difficulty of winning coverage in a particular outlet could possibly mediate the effects of senators' press activities on their home-state approval. But, those activities overall might positively affect approval, since an individual press conference or news release can reach constituents through any number of news outlets.
Moreover, the relationship between media activities and homestate support may not be positive for all levels of senator effort. If a senator works too hard to win news coverage, then constituents may perceive the legislator as a "show horse" more interested in attracting publicity than in representing their interests (Matthews 1960) . As a result, senators' approval ratings may actually decline if they participate in large numbers of press conferences and other media activities.
These three tactics for building voter support are available to all members of the U.S. Senate, but the existence of the tactics does not guarantee high levels of home-state support. Contextual factors beyond a senator's control may force the legislator to work harder to win voters' approval.
Context, Tactics, and Approval
Many characteristics of a state can make it easier or harder for a senator to win constituent approval. States with large populations may present greater challenges than their less-populated counterparts. California, Texas, and New York all contain extremely diverse populations with wide variation in concerns and preferences. An official representing such a state strives to represent this diversity in a single record and set of positions. It may not be possible for one senator to represent such diverse preferences, and many constituent groups may find fault with the senator (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) .
Another important characteristic of states is their economic performance (Abramowitz and Segal 1992) . A growing national economy may lift the popularity of incumbent politicians at any level. Positive national trends, however, may conceal considerable variation across regions of the country. Senators representing states with strong growth may still enjoy more favorable approval ratings, but their colleagues from states with weak or no growth may receive blame for the unfavorable economic trends. The economy's influence on approval ratings is largely beyond the control of individual legislators.
In addition to these state characteristics, 1 a range of other contextual factors may affect a senator's home-state support, despite their being partially or completely beyond his or her control. One such factor is seniority. Before each election, a legislator must decide whether to run again. A senator who raises a great deal of money can make his or her reelection very likely, but the outcome also depends on national trends and the decisions of quality challengers to enter the race (Jacobson and Kernell 1981) . So, although senators may wish to serve many years in the Senate, they do not enjoy complete control over their reelections. For those who do win successive elections, their growing seniority may bring higher approval ratings. With more years of service, they have more opportunities to help constituents and build favorable name recognition. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) exemplifies this pattern. A veteran of more than 40 years in the Senate, the senator "has worked every obscure South Carolina fair for decades. Until recently, every child who graduated from high school received a congratulatory letter from the senator, and it seems sometimes as if every one of them went on to intern in his office." 2 More junior members of the Senate have had fewer such opportunities to build home-state support.
The evaluations and activities of other elected officials may also influence a senator's approval ratings, and this influence could be beyond the senator's control. Most notably, constituents' evaluations of the president may affect their assessments of the senator, particularly if the two politicians come from the same party (Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Cohen et al. 2000) . During Ronald Reagan's presidency, voters appeared to link congressional Republicans closely to their president. Evaluations of all GOP officials often rose and fell in tandem (Jacobson 2001) . If a senator does not share the president's party, then the legislator's approval ratings may not be as closely linked to presidential evaluations. Membership in the "out party" may allow the senator to avoid being penalized for sharing a party with an unpopular president. U.S. Senators' Approval Ratings Conversely, out-party senators might be less likely to receive a boost from the president's coattails when he or she is enjoying more widespread popularity.
A senator's support among constituents may also depend on the actions of the other senator in the state delegation. The two senators representing a state often develop different policy portfolios, in hopes of creating distinct reputations in the eyes of constituents and developing their own ties with voters (Schiller 2000) . Constituents' comparisons of senators may shape the members' activities in other ways. One senator might introduce numerous bills and cultivate a "workhorse" reputation (Matthews 1960 ). In such a situation, the second senator in the delegation could find it harder to build constituent support with the same tactic, since it would not create a different reputation. For similar reasons, a senator who works very hard to win press coverage might make it more difficult for the other senator in the delegation to win coverage and thereby boost home-state approval.
Members' position taking can also affect voters' comparisons of their senators. If one senator's ideology is close to that of the state electorate, then this close proximity may create a baseline of comparison for the second senator in the delegation. Voters may penalize this second member for taking positions relatively far from the electorate's ideology. But if the first senator's ideology is also far from that of the state, then the baseline of comparison becomes more lenient. The second senator may face fewer penalties for an ideology far from that of the electorate. Of course, both senators may suffer lower approval ratings by failing to adopt the positions close to the state's ideology. But, one senator may face greater penalties if the second member is relatively close to the electorate's preferences.
Voters may also compare their senators on the basis of other factors, such as partisanship. If members of opposite parties make up a delegation, then constituents may use ideology less for distinguishing the two members. But if the senators in a delegation share a party, then voters may be forced to rely more heavily upon ideology for comparing the senators.
Finally, voters' comparisons of their state's senators may operate on a broader basis than the specific tactics of bill sponsorship, media activity, or position taking. Put simply, the more senior member of a delegation may overshadow his or her junior colleague. As the example of Senator Thurmond indicates, more senior members have often had many years to build constituent support through the three specific tactics mentioned here or others, such as constituent casework. The junior member of a delegation has often had fewer years to engage in such tactics and is likely to appear inferior on these evaluative dimensions when compared to the senior senator. The result is lower approval ratings for the junior senator.
Thus, presidential evaluations and the actions of the second senator in a delegation may affect the approval ratings of the delegation's first senator. This influence may be largely beyond the control of the first member. Individual senators can rarely affect a president's economic policies or the resulting economic performance. Individual senators have more influence with their state colleagues, yet they remain subject to the constant competition inherent in the structure of a state's Senate delegation. State Senate delegations notoriously compete for everything from media coverage to legislative influence (Baker 2000; Schiller 2000) . This competition suggests the limits of each senator's influence on a state colleague.
In sum, we have described a range of possible influences on senators' approval ratings, from the legislators' own tactics to contextual factors such as state characteristics and the evaluations and actions of other elected officials. We next describe our data and methods for investigating the actual impact of these factors.
Measuring Approval and Its Determinants
Our first step involves measuring senators' public approval. A common measure of home-state support is electoral performance, captured as either individual voters' choices in a survey or vote percentage at an aggregate level (Jacobson 2001) . A senator's electoral performance captures constituents' evaluations but also incorporates other factors. An election is more than a referendum on the incumbent; evaluations of the challenger, particularly relative to the incumbent, also enter vote choices and outcomes. Furthermore, these measures of electoral performance are available only once every six years for each senator. This limitation prevents examination of changes in constituent support within that six-year period.
We employ a different measure of home-state support, one that focuses more narrowly on evaluations of each senator and is more frequently available. The U.S. Official Job Approval Ratings website (Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman 2001a) provides 1,884 job approval ratings for individual senators from 1958 to 2000. These ratings came from surveys by commercial, media, and university organizations. Among the senatorial ratings, 96% were standard job performance questions referring broadly to a senator's performance, rather than to a specific issue. U.S. Senators' Approval Ratings
The first part of our analysis uses 552 of these senatorial approval ratings from 1981 to 1997; limited data for other variables prevented us from using the entire database of ratings. More than half the ratings came from the last three years of the period, reflecting the recent surge in political polling. Nonetheless, the ratings in our analysis still capture a diverse cross section of the U.S. Senate. The analysis includes senators in 47 states; 24 states contribute at least ten ratings. Democratic senators are the focus of 54.71% of the ratings, despite the fact that the Republican Party held a Senate majority for 9 of the 17 years in our analysis. We have at least one rating for 110 senators, or 59% of all individuals serving in the Senate during this period.
The approval ratings themselves average 52.27% over the 552 observations. The lowest rating was a 16% approval for Senator Dennis DeConcini, who wallowed in the Keating Five scandal in January 1991. At the other extreme, Senator Nancy Kassebaum received an 82% approval rating shortly before her retirement announcement in June 1995.
We must also operationalize a number of independent variables. Bill sponsorship, one of the factors that senators can control, is the number of bills introduced by a senator during the congress of his or her approval rating.
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To capture each senator's ideological proximity to the state electorate, we standardized measures of senators' ideology, compiled from roll-call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1985) , and measures of state ideology, taken from public opinion polls (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) . 6 Our measure of ideological proximity is the absolute value of the difference between the two standardized measures.
The ideal measure of senators' media activity would be the number of press events initiated by each senator in his or her home state. These counts are nearly impossible to obtain, particularly over the period of our analysis. As an alternative measure of senators' press efforts, we use a set of records compiled by the Senate Radio Television Gallery (SRTG). Since 1979, an SRTG staff member has attended every press event on the Senate side of Capitol Hill, from press conferences to impromptu interviews after caucus meetings. The SRTG staff member recorded each event's date and the senators appearing. Using these records, we measured a senator's media effort as the number of Capitol Hill press events attended by the senator during the six months prior to an approval rating. As previously noted, we expect a curvilinear relationship between press events and home-state approval. To capture that curvilinear relationship, we operationalize each senator's press events with two variables: the number of events and that same number squared.
A number of contextual variables are partially or completely beyond a senator's control. State population is the number of U.S. House districts in the state at the time of each approval rating. To capture state-level economic conditions, we use a measure of state per capita income during the year of a particular observation (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2001). Seniority is the number of years that each senator has served in the chamber (at the time of each observation).
Another set of independent variables involves the second senator in each delegation. We include measures of the second senator's seniority and reliance on the three tactics for boosting ratings. Since these measures may mediate the effects of the first senator's seniority and tactics, we add one term interacting the two senators' bill sponsorship and one term for their seniority. The interaction of the two senators' ideological positioning may also depend upon whether they share a political party. Accordingly, we include a dummy variable capturing whether the senators are from the same party. We also add interactions of all three variables related to ideological positioning.
Finally, presidential approval ratings in individual states were also available from the U.S. Official Job Approval Ratings website (Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman 2001a) . The effects of presidential approval may depend on whether a senator shares the president's party. We therefore include a dummy variable of whether the senator and president share a party, as well as an interaction between presidential approval and the dummy.
Contextual and Tactical Influences on Approval
In our model, the dependent variable is the senators' approval ratings. The unit of observation is a senator's rating in a particular month.
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Since the panels (110) outnumber the time periods (between 1 and 23), we turn to the family of longitudinal models (Greene 1993) . Because the senators' approval ratings display a normal distribution, we use a random effects regression model. This approach assumes that after incorporating the effects of the independent variables, the remaining unexplained variation in senators' ratings is random across individual senators. 9 We estimated the model in Stata 7.0, using the XTREG command. Table 1 presents the estimated results for this first model, which appears to fit the data fairly well. The significant χ 2 statistic and the overall R 2 indicate that the independent variables jointly do a good job of explaining variation in the senators' approval ratings. As part of this overall influence, two of the three tactics directly under a senator's control substantially affect the ratings. Notes: "S1" denotes the senator whose approval rating is the dependent variable. "S2" denotes the second senator in the delegation. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
By itself, each senator's bill sponsorship exerts little influence on approval. The sponsorship measure and its interaction are jointly significant (χ 2 = 25.26, p < .001). But, as Table 2 indicates, the predicted effects of sponsorship are small. For a senator who sponsors 9 bills (one standard deviation below the mean), 10 the model predicts a rating of 53.99%. Increasing the number of bills to 47 (one standard deviation above the mean) actually lowers the predicted rating to 51.75%. The two predictions produce overlapping 95% confidence intervals, suggesting that the pattern may be due only to random variation.
We found a stronger relationship between senators' ideological positioning and their approval ratings. The measure of a senator's ideological proximity to the electorate and the measure's related interaction terms are jointly significant (χ 2 = 21.56, p < .001). The predicted effects of these variables fit our expectations (see Table 2 ). A senator receives a higher predicted rating by taking positions close to the electorate's ideology (54.57%) than by taking positions far from that ideology (50.72%). The 95% confidence intervals around these predictions slightly overlap; the corresponding 90% intervals do not. We can therefore be more confident that these differences actually exist and do not result from random variation.
Of the three tactics for boosting home-state support, press activity exerts the strongest influence. The two variables capturing this effect are jointly significant (χ 2 = 11.35, p < .001). Figure 1 displays the predicted influence of press events on the approval ratings for the actual cases in our dataset. As expected, increasing the number of events from 1 to 21 raises the predicted rating by 4 points (from 51.24% to 55.24%). At this point, the confidence interval around the higher prediction no longer overlaps with that of the lower prediction. The predicted rating rises to a high of 56.34% when the number of events reaches 40, indicating a threshold for the effects of media events. As the number of events increases beyond 40, the predicted approval rating begins to fall.
The link between Capitol Hill press events and home-state approval ratings may operate in several ways. The events in Washington may win coverage in national media outlets, which in turn may transmit those events to constituents. In addition, an active media strategy on Capitol Hill may be part of a senator's broader effort to win home-state and national coverage. With either mechanism, senators participating in more Capitol Hill press events tend to enjoy higher home-state approval ratings.
Other influences on home-state approval lie less directly within a senator's control.
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The measure of state population, as expected, produced a negative and strongly significant coefficient. Table 2 indicates that a senator representing a state with a single at-large House district receives a predicted rating of 56.93%. In contrast, a senator Notes: "S1" denotes the senator whose approval rating is the dependent variable. An asterisk after a predicted rating indicates that the 95% confidence interval around that prediction does not overlap with the corresponding prediction immediately above. We calculated the predicted values and related standard errors using the model estimates in Table 1 . For each prediction, we assigned the independent variable of interest to a value one standard deviation below or above its mean. Dummy independent variables were coded as 0 or 1. All other variables were held at their means.
representing a state with 28 districts receives a predicted rating more than nine points lower (47.87%). Again, the confidence intervals for these predictions do not overlap. This difference suggests that Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) receives higher approval ratings than his Democratic colleague Senator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) simply because of the relative difference in the population sizes of their states. The most extreme example of this challenge is California, with its 52 House districts in the 1990s. Our model predicts that the state's senators, Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, each receive an approval rating of 39.80%. This extremely low rating confirms the findings of Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) that larger states tend to be more heterogeneous and thus more difficult to represent. State economic performance is another influence on approval ratings beyond the control of individual senators. Recall our expectation that stronger economic performance would be associated with more favorable ratings. The model produced a significant coefficient for state per capita income, but the sign was negative. Higher per capita income is associated with less favorable approval ratings. This negative relationship appears to be a statistical artifact resulting from trending in the income variable. Reflecting both inflation and Americans' gradually rising income, our income measure rises gradually and almost continuously each year over the period of our analysis. When we added a measure of year to the model, to control for non-inflationary trending, the income measure became insignificant, with a p-value of .592. We also replaced income with a measure of state unemployment, which does not rise continuously over time. This alternative measure of economic performance was also insignificant, with a p-value of .576. 
Press Events Predicted Approval Rating
Although a senator can only partially control seniority, this variable strongly influences home-state approval. The measure and its related interaction term both produce significant coefficients. Their predicted influence, as reported in Table 2 , fits our expectations. A member with 21 years of service enjoys more than a five-point advantage in predicted approval (55.89% versus 50.55%) over a colleague with 3 years of service. The separation of the confidence intervals around these predictions suggests even more robustness in the estimated effects. As legislators work to build name recognition and serve their states, the accumulation of such efforts over time can translate into higher approval ratings. The boost from seniority exists even after controlling for each senator's bill sponsorship, ideological positioning, and press activity at the time of the approval rating.
The evaluations and actions of other elected officials also affect each senator's home-state approval. A state electorate's evaluation of the president appears significantly linked to the senators' ratings, although partisanship mediates this effect. The three variables capturing these effects are jointly significant (χ 2 = 38.01, p < .001). We found a stronger effect for senators sharing the president's party than for senators in the opposing party. For the president's party colleagues in the Senate, raising a state presidential approval rating from 35% to 55% produces a jump of nearly four points in a senator's predicted approval (from 49.10% to 53.07%). The 95% confidence intervals for these two predictions barely overlap; the corresponding 90% confidence intervals do not overlap at all. The magnitude of this effect is relatively modest compared to the 20-point change assigned to presidential approval, but the effect is still nearly significantly at the 95% confidence level. Presidential approval appears to influence the home-state support of the president's fellow party members in the Senate, and this influence extends beyond elections. In contrast, members of the out party maintain more independence from the president's political fortunes. For a senator not sharing the president's party, raising the presidential approval rating in the senator's state by the same amount is associated with a jump of 1.83 percentage points in the senator's predicted rating (from 53.28% to 55.11%). The 95% confidence intervals for these two predictions largely overlap, suggesting that presidential approval has relatively little influence on this type of senator.
The model also suggests that the link between a senator's actions and approval rating is contingent upon the other senator in the delegation. The second senator's press activity appears unimportant to the first senator's rating, 12 yet the two senators' bill sponsorship exerts an interactive effect on approval. When the second senator introduces Notes: "S1" denotes the senator whose approval rating is the dependent variable. "S2" denotes the second senator in the delegation. An asterisk after a predicted rating indicates that the 95% confidence interval around that prediction does not overlap with the corresponding prediction immediately above. We calculated the predicted values and related standard errors using the model estimates in Table 1 . For each prediction, we assigned the independent variable of interest to a value one standard deviation below or above its mean. Dummy independent variables were coded as 0 or 1. All other variables were held at their means.
only 9 bills, boosting the first senator's sponsorship from 9 to 47 bills leaves the first senator's predicted rating nearly unchanged (see Table  3 ). But if the second senator introduces 47 bills, the same change in the first senator's sponsorship lowers that senator's predicted rating by more than four points (from 54.25% to 50.22%). The 95% confidence intervals around these predictions barely overlap; the 90% intervals do not. Thus, we can be fairly confident that changing from low to high levels of bill sponsorship can harm a senator's home-state support if the other senator in the delegation also introduces many bills. The interaction of the two senators is also important when considering how ideological positioning affects home-state support. The two senators' measures of ideology proximity and the related interaction terms jointly exert a significant influence on the approval ratings (χ 2 = 29.03, p < .001). Fitting our expectations, the predicted ratings in Table 3 present the exact nature of this influence. Consider a situation in which the second senator in a delegation is close to the state's ideological position. The first senator suffers a drop of more than six points in the predicted approval rating (from 54.90% to 48.37%) if he or she moves from close to far from the state's ideological position. The predictions' non-overlapping confidence intervals suggest that these differences are unlikely to result from random variation. If the second senator is already far from the state's ideological position, however, then the same change in the first senator's ideology exerts little impact on approval ratings.
The ideological comparisons of the senators become even more evident when we consider another basis of comparison: party. All seven variables related to ideology are jointly significant in the model in Table 1 (χ 2 = 29.46, p < .001). The interaction of ideology and partisanship are apparent in the model's predicted values in Table 3 . In a split-party delegation, changes in the first senator's ideology do not produce statistically significant changes in his or her predicted approval ratings, regardless of the second senator's ideology. If a split-party delegation represents a state, then its voters can use partisanship to distinguish between their two senators. The ideological positions are less important.
In contrast, partisan affiliation cannot help constituents when their senators share a party. Consequently, ideology becomes a more important tool for comparing and evaluating senators in same-party delegations. If the second senator's ideological position is close to that of the electorate, then the same change in the first senator's ideology leads to a decline of more than eight points in the predicted approval rating (from 54.80% to 46.51%). The corresponding confidence intervals are widely separated. If the second senator is far from the state electorate, however, then the same change in the first senator's ideology produces a smaller change in home-state approval (54.05% to 49.82%), with overlapping confidence intervals surrounding the predictions. When one senator in a same-party delegation is close to constituents' positions, voters levy more penalties on the other senator for taking positions far from their own.
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In addition to the interactive effects of a delegation's bill sponsorship and ideological positioning, the relative seniority of a delegation's members can also influence each senator's home-state support. The three variables capturing the interactive effects of seniority are all significant. If a state's senators differ substantially in seniority, then the more senior senator appears to benefit. For example, if the second senator has served for only 3 years, then changing the first senator's seniority from 3 to 21 years raises the predicting rating for the senator from 49.14% to 57.45% (with non-overlapping confidence intervals). But if the second senator has 21 years of seniority, then the same change in the first senator's seniority produces a much smaller change in the predicted rating (from 52.20% to 54.06%, with overlapping confidence intervals). These patterns mean that seniority's boost to a senator's home-state approval depends on the seniority of the other senator in the delegation.
Conclusion
Senators clearly want to maximize the likelihood that they are reelected, so they seek to build favorable impressions with constituents. In this task, they face contextual factors beyond their control, such as economic performance, presidential policies, and the size and ideological preferences of their constituencies. Senators respond to these contextual constraints with a variety of tactics. They hold press conferences, construct roll-call voting records, and introduce bills, all in the hopes of attracting media attention and constituent reward. We have demonstrated that senators' efforts pay off to some extent, but the contextual factors beyond their control tend to exert more influence on their approval ratings.
Our findings suggest a number of broader implications about the dynamics of representation in the Senate. First, although senators' media activities can improve their home-state evaluations, the positive effects of these promotional activities can also open the door to manipulation of approval ratings. Senators may present their positions and record in the best possible light, with these potentially inaccurate presentations boosting voters' evaluations. But the strong link between ideological positioning and approval ratings suggests a limit on senators' ability to manipulate those ratings. A state electorate gives higher approval ratings to a senator who is close to the electorate's ideology. Distance from the electorate brings lower ratings. Constituents appear to incorporate senators' actual voting records into their evaluations, regardless of how the legislators' portray or manipulate those records.
Second, the state electorates do not appear to evaluate each of their elected officials in isolation. We confirm prior work that suggests a strong link between presidential and senatorial approval ratings. When the senator shares the president's party, evaluations of the president will have an impact on the legislator's approval rating. Our analysis suggests another type of collective evaluation: the Senate delegation. The actions and statements of one senator in a delegation appear to influence voters' assessments of the other senator. When one senator adopts an ideological position far from the state electorate's, the magnitude of the accompanying political penalties appears to hinge on the party and ideology of the second senator. It also appears that the advantage of seniority in a delegation is relative. Increasing years of service most improve a senator's approval ratings if that member is much more senior than the junior member of the state delegation. Seniority has little effect on approval if both members of a delegation have served for similar numbers of years.
Finally, the collection of senatorial approval ratings opens the door to a number of future investigations. We have not yet examined the post-election effects of a tough reelection race. Does a difficult campaign weaken a senator for the entire next term, or do the effects of elections wear off quickly? In addition, future elections will provide more approval ratings, allowing us to explore generational patterns in approval ratings. In recent years, Congress has grown increasingly partisan, as well as more dependent upon the news media. These developments are likely to have affected approval ratings and the accountability of legislators to voters that the ratings can provide.
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1. Another potentially relevant characteristic is the structure of each state's media markets, particularly the news mix and market dominance (Stewart and Reynolds 1990) . We found little evidence that the market structure affects home-state approval, however.
2. James Bennett, "Strom in the Balance," New York Times, 29 April 2001. 3. Uslaner (1999) demonstrates that senators from the same state and the same party do strategically try to adopt slightly different ideological stances.
4. Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman (2001b) report a potential problem in using these data: the ratings scales vary across the surveys. The Senate ratings include survey questions containing two to five categories. Approximately 70% of the senatorial ratings exclude a middle, neutral rating category. "Given only two options-approve and disapprove-a respondent who thinks the governor is doing a 'so-so' job might well choose 'approve,' for to 'disapprove' implies quite a negative assessment" (2001b, 6). We separated the senatorial approval ratings by the number of response categories in each rating's survey question. We then reestimated the models using each group of ratings. The results declined somewhat in significance (because of the smaller sample sizes), but they were largely similar to the findings reported here.
5. We compiled the counts of introduced bills from Congressional Quarterly's electronic database (www.oncongress.cq.com) and from the Congressional Record.
6. These data were generated from survey responses between 1976 and 1988. More recent but incomplete data provided by Gerald Wright (2000) indicate that state ideology has changed very little since then.
7. We found no evidence of interactive effects between the two senators' press activities.
8. This framework reinforces the fact that our data are a sample of senators' approval ratings during this period. Regardless of the level of aggregation, we cannot comprehensively capture all senators' state-level approvals because those ratings do not exist for some legislators. In addition, aggregating by month allows more precise measurement of several independent variables. We reestimated the model below with the data aggregated by year instead of month. At this level of aggregation, the number of cases falls to 341 because a number of senators had more than one rating in a year. The new estimation did not produce substantially different results, but there were two exceptions: the measures of press events and presidential approval (which can both be captured on a monthly basis) appeared less significant.
9. The Hausman specification test indicates that this assumption is valid for both models here. The alternative to a random effects specification is a fixed effects model. In our case, the latter model includes a dummy variable for each senator, which may explain variation attributable to our other independent variables. When we estimate this model with a fixed effects specification, the resulting estimates are slightly weaker but still very similar to the random effects estimates reported here. No variables significant in the random effects version became insignificant in the fixed effects version; only two variables (that were strongly insignificant) changed signs.
10. When calculating a predicted value for a particular independent variable, we almost always follow this convention of setting that independent variable one standard deviation above and then below its mean (King 1989) . The only exceptions are dummy independent variables, which we set at 0 and 1. For each prediction, we calculated the corresponding standard error using the PREDICT command in Stata.
11. Our initial estimation of this model included two additional, but insignificant, influences on approval ratings: the legislator's gender and the year of each senator's current term (ranging from 1 to 6). The nonfinding involving gender most likely results from the small number of female senators' ratings in our dataset (eight individual senators and 11% of the 571 total ratings). We might find stronger results with a dataset more balanced in gender.
12. The two variables capturing the second senator's press activity were individually and jointly insignificant (χ 2 = 1.01, p = .60).
13. We also explored whether ideological extremity affects home-state approval. In the model for Table 1 , we replaced the senators' ideological proximity measures with corresponding ones for extremity. Since the rating of senators' ideology ranges from -.999 to 1, we calculated the absolute value of that rating (Kuklinski and Sigelman 1992) . In the new measure, higher values denote more extreme ideological positions. In the reestimated model, the extremity measures were jointly significant. Greater ideological extremity was associated with lower approval ratings, particularly if the second senator in a delegation also adopted an extreme ideology. The changes in predicted approval ratings were relatively small, however, and the corresponding confidence intervals always overlapped.
